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1. Introduction 
The efficiency of the European banking industry has attracted particular research 
attention, as is documented by its long tradition in the literature (i.e., Allen and Rai 
(1996), Lozano-Vivas et al., 2001, De Guevara and Maudos, 2002, Maudos et al., 
2002, Vander Vennet, 2002, and Casu and Molyneux, 2003). A large number of 
studies on bank efficiency has emerged as a result of rapid changes in the structure of 
the European financial services industry in response to major advances in regulation 
and technology and to the implementation of the EU Single Market and the Monetary 
Union. These developments have created a more competitive financial sector 
throughout Europe and have spurred research interest in the banking systems of the 
European Union. Indeed, in light of the increased competition under the Single 
Market for financial services, the ability of EU credit institutions to compete and 
survive in an increasingly integrated European financial landscape has become even 
more important. This has been convincingly highlighted by the recent financial crisis, 
as the emergence of an increasingly integrated financial market in the EU has 
increased contagion risks, thereby jeopardizing financial stability (De Larosiere 
Report, 2009). Moreover, the different structures and past legacies of the European 
countries create additional challenges in terms of real convergence in a unified 
European banking market. At the same time, the dominant role played by banks in the 
provision of financial services in the European economies makes the performance of 
the banking system crucial for economic development and for the sound functioning 
of the industrial sectors, as an improvement of bank performance would lead to a 
better allocation of financial resources, and therefore to an increase of investment that 
favors growth (Molyneux et al., 1996). 
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 The importance of efficiency measures as instruments for the analysis of bank 
performance becomes explicit, partly because efficiency scores provide an accurate 
evaluation of the performance of individual banks, but also of the financial industry as 
a whole, and partly because of the information that efficiency scores entail regarding 
the cost of financial intermediation and the overall stability of financial markets. 
Several studies have investigated efficiency in the European banking industry, and 
particularly focused on cross-country comparisons, using either parametric (i.e., Allen 
and Rai, 1996; Altunbas et al., 2001; Bikker, 2002; Carbo et al., 2002; De Guevara 
and Maudos, 2002; Maudos et al., 2002; Vander Vennet, 2002) or non-parametric 
approaches (i.e., Lozano-Vivas et al., 2001; 2002; Casu and Molyneux, 2003) or both 
(Weill, 2004). Overall, one of the main findings of most of these studies is the 
existence of significant efficiency differences across EU countries.  
However, despite the plethora of studies investigating efficiency in the 
European banking industry, this paper departs from previous literature in several 
ways. First, we use, for the first time, quantile regression analysis to estimate banks’ 
cost function. This type of analysis, proposed by Koenker and Bassett (1978), allows 
us to derive different parameter estimates of the cost function for various quantiles of 
the conditional distribution and as a result different efficiency scores. In particular, the 
quantile regression relaxes one of the fundamental conditions of the OLS and permits 
estimating various quantile functions, examining in particular the tail behaviours of 
that distribution.1 Therefore, quantile regression is capable of providing a complete 
statistical analysis of the underlying diversity of stochastic relationships among 
stochastic variables by supplementing the estimation of conditional mean functions 
with an entire family of conditional quantile functions.  
                                               
1
 In general, each quantile regression characterizes a particular, centre or tail, point of a conditional 
distribution. This approach estimates also the median (0.5th quantile) function as a special case, which 
approximates the mean function of the conditional distribution of banks’ cost. 
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Secondly, we investigate the relationship between cost efficiency and risk 
across different quantiles. This interaction has become particularly important, in light 
also of recent adverse events in global financial markets. In particular, the on-going 
financial crisis has indentified several shortcomings in the functioning of the global 
financial system and specifically, significant incentive misalignments that have 
greatly contributed, on the micro level, to the current financial turmoil (Caprio et al. 
2008). In essence, these misaligned incentive structures have contributed to an 
understatement of true risk, generating mispricing of credit instruments. In light of 
this, the quantile regression analysis allows us to examine whether the underlying 
relationship between risk and performance changes across quantiles. This is an issue 
of particular importance as the recent crisis has demonstrated that the tales of the 
distribution, i.e. representing higher risk, may hold the key of understanding what 
have been malfunctioned in the banking industry. 
Moreover, we measure risk using banks’ distance to default (DD thereafter) 
(see Merton, 1974), which is considered to be a more comprehensive indicator of risk 
than the commonly used index-number proxies based on accounting data. To 
empirically estimate cost efficiency, we follow Berger (1993) and employ the 
Distribution-free approach (DFA thereafter). Apart from risk, in a second stage 
analysis, we also investigate the relationship between efficiency and other bank 
specific and macroeconomic variables. 
Overall, we employ the quantile regression methodology to address a number 
of questions regarding cost efficiency and risk in the European banking system and 
discuss their policy implications. What is the level of cost efficiency across countries 
under different quantiles? Is there a general trend that can describe the evolution of 
efficiency scores when estimated for different quantiles? What is the relationship 
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between efficiency and risk and how does this relationship evolve across quantiles? 
What is the relationship between efficiency and various banking variables and does 
quantile estimation affect these interactions?    
A first glimpse at the results shows efficiency scores exhibiting marked 
diversity across quantiles that would go unnoticed in the classical efficiency 
estimations. In particular, we find that in higher quantiles average cost efficiency is 
lower compared to that of lower quantiles. In addition, our analysis regarding the 
relationship between risk and efficiency suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between efficiency and banks’ distance to default, especially in the case of lower  
conditional distributions. Moreover, the second-stage regression analysis reveals that 
the interaction between efficiency and various banking and macroeconomic variables 
varies substantially across quantiles. Two notable examples are the relationship 
between cost efficiency and bank concentration and the relationship between 
efficiency and credit risk.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
methodology, while Section 3 provides the description of the data. Section 4 discusses 
the empirical results, while conclusions are drawn in Section 5. 
 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Quantile regression 
Quantile regression is a statistical technique intended to estimate, and perform 
inference about, conditional quantile functions. This analysis is particularly useful 
when the conditional distribution does not have a standard shape, such as an 
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asymmetric, fat-tailed, or truncated distribution.2 In the context of our study, quantile 
analysis provides an ideal tool to examine evidence on bank efficiency heterogeneity, 
departing from conditional-mean models.  
 
Moreover, let y be a random variable with the distribution function FY and Φ 
be a real number between zero and one. The Φth quantile of FY we denote as qY(Φ) 
and is derived as the solution to Fy = Φ, that is 
 
qY(Φ):= }{ Φ≥=Φ− )(:inf)(1 yFyF YY  
This simply implies that 100Φth% (100(1-Φ)%) of the probability mass of Y is below 
(above) qY(Φ).  
 
As in the case of the least squares estimator the Φth quantile of FY is derived by 
minimizing an objective function with respect to q, i.e.,  
∫∫
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Y
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Note that the first order condition of this minimisation problem gives the Φth quantile 
of FY as 
∫∫
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2
 Quantile regression has recently gained attention in the financial literature, and particularly in the 
field of empirical finance. For example, Taylor (1999) provides quantile estimates for the distribution 
of multi-period returns, whilst Basset and Chen (2001) use quantile regression index models to 
characterise the diversity of mutual fund investment styles. For excellent reviews of the literature, see 
Koenker (2000) and Koenker and Hallock (2001). 
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The solution gives βΦ which is the Φth conditional quantile 
Φ=Φ β')(/ XQ XY
. 
 
Given the above, a quantile regression involves the estimation of conditional 
quantile functions, i.e., models in which quantiles of the conditional distribution of the 
dependent variable are expressed as functions of observed covariates (Koenker and 
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Hallock, 2000). Briefly stating standard formulation, the linear regression model takes 
the form: 
φφ εβ iitit xy +=       (1) 
where φ ∈(0, 1), xi is a K × 1 vector of regressors, xi βφ denotes the φth sample 
quantile of y (conditional on vector xi), and εiφ is a random error whose conditional 
quantile distribution equals zero.  
In general, the objective function for efficient estimation of β corresponding to 
the φth quantile of the dependent variable (y) can be expressed by the following 
minimization problem: 






−−+− ∑∑
≤≥ ββ
β βφβφ
iiii xyi
ii
xyi
ii xyxy
n ::
)1(1min
  (2) 
which is solved via linear programming. Note that the median estimator, that is, 
quantile regression estimator for φ = 0.5, is similar to the least-squares estimator for 
Gaussian linear models, except that it minimizes the sum of absolute residuals rather 
than the sum of squared residuals. 
 
2.2 Estimating cost efficiency 
A number of different approaches have been proposed in the literature for the 
estimation of bank efficiency, each of which has its individual strengths and 
weaknesses (see Berger and Humphrey 1997 for a review). In this study we opt for a 
parametric methodology and employ the Distribution-free approach (DFA), developed 
by Berger (1993), who follows Schmidt and Sickless (1984). This approach is a 
particularly attractive technique due to its flexibility as it does not impose a-priori any 
specific shape on the distribution of efficiency (DeYoung, 1997). Instead of that, the 
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DFA methodology assumes that the inefficiency of each financial institution remains 
constant across the sample period and that random error averages out over time.3 
By averaging the residuals to estimate bank-specific efficiency, DFA estimates 
how well a bank tends to do relative to its competitors over a range of conditions over 
time, rather than its relative efficiency at any one point in time (DeYoung, 1997). This 
is useful in the banking sector, since relative efficiencies among different banks may 
shift somewhat over time because of changes in management, technical change, 
regulatory reform, the interest rate cycle, and other environmental influences.4 
However, the rationality of the DFA assumptions depends on the length of period 
studied.5 Empirical investigation (i.e., DeYoung, 1997; Mester, 2003) into the number 
of years that may be needed to strike a balance between the benefits from having an 
additional observation to help average the random error and the costs associated with 
adding extra information, which increases the likelihood that the efficiency in the 
extra year might drift further away from its long term level shows that a six year 
period reasonably balances these concerns. 
For the estimation of the Distribution-free approach we opt for the translog cost 
function6, which gives us the following specification: 
                                               
3
 In detail, the formal procedure used to carry out the separation between inefficiency and the random 
error can be described in three steps. First, a consecutive series of annual cost functions are estimated 
for a given set of banks and some predetermined number of years. Secondly, based on this estimated 
function, the difference between the observed cost and the predicted cost is calculated for each bank, 
and for each period. Finally, for each bank, the persistent components observed during the sample 
period are identified and for each bank, the resulting time series of estimated residuals is averaged 
across time so as to separate cost inefficiency from the annual random errors. 
4
 According to Berger and Humphrey (1997) the DFA approach gives a better indication of a bank’s 
longer-term performance by averaging over a number of conditions, than any of the other methods, 
which rely on a bank’s performance under a single set of circumstances. Therefore, under DFA a panel 
data is required and only panel estimates of efficiency over the entire time interval are available. 
5
 Choosing a too short period, may leave large amounts of random error in the averaged residuals, in 
which case random error would be attributed to inefficiency. On the other hand, if too long a period is 
chosen, the firm’s average efficiency might not be constant over the time period because of changes in 
environmental conditions making it less meaningful (DeYoung, 1997). 
6
 The translog functional form has been widely employed in the efficiency literature. Berger and 
Mester (1997) have compared the translog to the more flexible Fourier Flexible Form (FFF) and found 
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lnCi = α0 + ∑
i
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i
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where all variables are expressed in natural logs.7 Cit denotes observed total cost for 
bank i, Pi is a vector of input prices Yj is a vector of bank outputs, and N is a vector of 
fixed netputs8. Moreover, because structural conditions in banking and general 
macroeconomic conditions may generate differences in banking efficiency from 
country to country, we also include country effects in the estimation of the cost 
frontier. Note that ui is the bank specific efficiency factor and vi is the random error 
term. All elements of Equation (3) are allowed to vary across time with the exception 
of ui, which remains constant for each bank by assumption. In the estimation, the lnvi 
and ln ui terms are treated as a composite error term, i.e., iii uv ˆlnˆlnˆln +=ε . Once 
estimated the residuals, iεln , are averaged across T years for each bank i. The 
averaged residuals are estimates of the X-efficiency terms, ln ui , because the random 
error terms, lnvi, tend to cancel each other out in the averaging. Thus, bank’s i 
efficiency is defined as: 
)]ˆlnˆexp[(ln
)ˆexp[(ln)(ˆexp[([
)]ˆexp[(ln)(ˆexp[
min
min
i
iii
ii
i uu
uypf
uypf
EFF −==
     (4) 
where ˆln iu is the residual vector after having averaged over time and minˆln u  is the 
most efficient bank in the sample.  
                                                                                                                                       
that despite the latter’s added flexibility, the difference in results between these methods appears to be 
very small. 
7
 To ensure that the estimated cost frontier is well behaved, standard homogeneity and symmetry 
restrictions are imposed: ∑ =
i
ia 1 , ∑ =
i
ija 0 , ∑ =
i
ij 0δ , ∑ =
i
ij 0ξ , αim = αmi and αjk= αkj, mkji ,,,∀ . 
8
 Fixed netputs are quasi-fixed quantities of either inputs or outputs that affect variable costs. 
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3. Data description 
Our data comprises of all listed banks over the period 2000 to 2005 in fourteen 
European Union Member States, namely: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden 
and the UK. Balance-sheet and income statement data were obtained from the 
Bankscope database, while for the estimation of bank default risk, stock price data 
were obtained from the combination of Datastream, Bloomberg and Bankscope 
databases. After reviewing the data for reporting errors and other inconsistencies, we 
obtain a balanced panel dataset of 690 observations, which includes a total of 115 
different banks. The number of banks varies widely across countries, ranging from 3 
in Luxembourg to 34 in Denmark. 
For the definition of bank inputs and outputs, we follow the intermediation 
approach proposed by Sealey and Lindley (1977.9 The output vector includes loans 
(defined as total loans net of provisions) and other earning assets, while total cost is 
defined as the sum of overheads (personnel and administrative expenses), interest, fee, 
and commission expenses. Regarding input prices, the price of labour is proxied by 
the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets, while the price of deposits is defined as 
the ratio of interest expenses to total funds. We also specify physical capital and 
equity as fixed netputs. The treatment of physical capital as a fixed input is relatively 
standard in efficiency estimation (Berger and Mester, 1997)10, while the level of 
                                               
9
 A variety of approaches have been proposed in the literature for the definition of bank inputs and 
outputs; yet, there is little agreement among economists as what unequivocally constitutes an 
acceptable definition, mainly as a result of the nature and functions of financial intermediaries. See 
Berger and Humphrey (1992) for a review of the various methods used to define inputs and outputs in 
financial services. 
10
 Physical capital is considered as fixed netput, and not as input, partly due to the difficulty in 
calculating a reliable input price for fixed assets in the absence of data on the market value of real 
estate and premises.  
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equity is included so as to account for both the risk-based capital requirements and the 
risk-return trade-off that bank owners face (Färe et al., 2004). Apart from this, a 
bank’s capital directly affects costs by providing an alternative to deposits as a 
funding source for loans (see Berger and Mester, 1997).  
The methodology for the computation of bank default risk is presented in the 
Appendix (Appendix A). The annual equity volatility for each bank is estimated based 
on the daily returns, derived as the standard deviation of the moving average of daily 
equity returns times 261 . All liabilities are assumed to be due in one year, T=1, 
while as the risk free interest rate we take the twelve months interbank rate, except for 
Greece, for which we opt for the six month interbank rate due to data availability. 
Liabilities are derived from Bankscope Fitch IBCA and include the total amount of 
deposits, money market funding, bonds, and subordinated debt. 
(Please insert Table 1 about here) 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the main variables used in this study 
by country and for the overall sample over the period 2000-2005. Overall, there are 
considerable variations across countries in relation to cost, outputs quantities and 
input prices, as well as differences regarding the size of the country-specific control 
variables.  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Cost efficiency under a quantile regression analysis 
The estimated parameters of the translog cost function for quantiles 0.05, 0.25, 0.5, 
0.75 and 0.95, are presented in Appendix B. These estimates have been obtained using 
simultaneous quantile regression analysis. The advantage of this method is the 
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estimation of the entire variance-covariance matrix, which allows us to test the 
hypothesis of whether the coefficients between different quantiles are equal.11 Table 2 
presents the test results for the various quantiles. All tests show that coefficients are 
statistically different from each other between all quantiles, confirming the validity of 
our analysis. 
(Please insert Table 2 about here) 
Next, we calculate cost efficiency scores for each bank in our sample using the 
Distribution-free approach and compare these scores across quantiles and across 
countries. Figure 1 presents the average efficiency scores by country across quantiles ( 
0.05 to 0.95).   
(Please insert Figure 1 about here) 
Overall, we observe a marked variability between the average efficiency 
scores across quantiles, suggesting that previous research on efficiency, which is 
based on the approximation of the mean function of the conditional distribution, 
delivers an incomplete notion of the efficiency dispersion across banks. In particular, 
the average efficiency score for the whole sample ranges from 0.68 for quantile 0.95 
to 0.88 for quantile 0.05. More importantly, cost efficiency estimates across quantiles, 
and particularly in the tail of the distribution, differ substantially from the conditional 
mean (OLS) point estimate of efficiency, as it is approximated by quantile 0.5. This 
suggests that the quantile regression analysis clearly provides a more comprehensive 
picture of the underlying range of disparities in cost efficiency that the classical 
estimation would have missed. 
Moreover, note that a distinct common pattern emerges across quantiles. In 
particular, we observe that average efficiency follows a negative trend at higher order 
                                               
11
 Coefficient standard errors were obtained by bootstrapping with 100 sample replications. 
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of quantiles, indicating the existence of monotonically decreasing quantile efficiency. 
In particular, cost efficiency is estimated at around 0.88 for quantile 0.05, drops to 
0.85 for quantile 0.25, declines further to 0.78 and 0.71 for quantiles 0.50 and 0.75 
respectively, while it reaches its minimum value at 0.68 when the cost function is 
calculated at the 0.95 quantile. Nevertheless, this observed pattern between average 
efficiency and quantile conditional distributions is less clear in the cases of Germany 
and the UK. In particular, the average cost efficiency for German banks drops from 
0.85 for quantile 0.05 to 0.68 for quantile 0.75, but rises to 0.74 when the cost 
function is estimated at the 0.95 quantile. Similarly, in the case of the UK, average 
cost efficiency drops from 0.89 at quantile 0.05 to 0.68 at quantile 0.75, while it 
remains stable when the cost function is estimated at the 0.95 quantile. Overall, 
efficiency scores exhibit however a negative trend at higher quantiles for the majority 
of countries, that is, average efficiency decreases for the upper tail of the distribution.  
(Please insert Table 3 about here) 
To shed more light into our analysis, Table 3 presents the estimated cost 
efficiency scores for each bank in our sample across different quantiles. Overall, 
Table 3 reveals a similar picture to the one of Figure 1, and confirms our previous 
finding of a negative trend of efficiency scores across higher quantiles. In particular, 
for the vast majority of banks in our sample, efficiency scores decrease as the cost 
function is estimated at higher quantiles. Yet, there are some notable exceptions, 
concerning mostly German and British banks. Note, for example, DAB Bank, 
Deutsche Bank, HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt AG, Irish Life & Permanent Plc, LBB 
Holding AG, Man Group Plc and Oldenburgische Landesbank (OLB), which present 
the most notable exceptions. Moreover, Dexia, Fortis, Irish Life & Permanent Plc, 
KBC Groupe SA and Oesterreichische Volksbanken AG report a cost efficiency score 
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that is higher in quantile 0.95 compared to quantile 0.75. In the case of IKB Deutsche 
Industriebank AG cost efficiency is higher in the upper tail of the distribution, 
quantile 0.75, compared to quantile 0.5. These findings may be of some interest in the 
aftermath of the recent credit crisis as Dexia and Fortis were among the banks that 
came close to default, whereas IKB closed hedge funds in 2007 as a result of the 
experienced large losses linked to the downturn in the U.S. mortgage market. Given 
that for these banks the classical estimations underestimate their underlying 
inefficiency scores, quantile analysis appropriately identifies the true disparity of 
efficiency scores across conditional distributions, which in turn would be of crucial 
importance for the performance, and ultimately for the survival of banks.   
 
4.2 Cost efficiency and risk  
The previous section has showed that the disparity of efficiency scores across 
conditional distributions would prove critical for appropriately assessing the 
performance of financial institutions. In this section, we go a step further and examine 
the relationship between cost efficiency and risk, as measured by the distance to 
default, focusing mainly on the evolution of this interaction across quantiles. The link 
between efficiency and risk has long been at the centre of academic research (see for 
example, Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Mester, 1996; Hughes, 1999; Hughes et al., 
2001; Altunbas et al., 2000), while the current financial crisis has further highlighted 
the shortcomings and inadequacies of risk management models based on Basel II and 
has stressed the need to re-appraise the relationship between risk and performance.  
Figure 2 shows in scatter plot the relationship between the estimated average 
cost efficiency scores for all banks in our sample and four categories of DD scores. 
These categories are defined according to the median value of the estimated distance-
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to-default as follows: the first category includes the riskiest banks in the sample, with 
estimated DD scores ranging from 0 to 6, while the second riskier group of banks has 
DD scores ranging from 6 to 8. The majority of financial institutions in our sample 
belongs to the next two categories, with DD scores ranging from 8 to 10.34 and from 
10.35 to 13 respectively. Lastly, the least risky banks in our sample are grouped in the 
fifth category that have distance-to-default scores higher than 13.12 Overall, and 
despite some extreme cases, Figure 2 shows that the relationship between DD scores 
and the average efficiency across countries remains relatively stable for low values of 
the distance to default, whereas for higher values of the distance to default a slight 
positive trend can be observed. This picture might imply that average quantile 
efficiency could be positively linked to the distance to default. However, given that 
efficiency scores in Figure 2 present average scores across banks, this heavy 
averaging could blur the view of the exact nature of the underlying relationships. 
To sharpen the picture, Figure 3 presents efficiency scores under different 
quantiles plotted against the distance to default categories defined above. At a first 
glimpse, an interesting finding is that for each category of DD scores, average 
efficiency levels derived under different quantiles exhibit a clear trend. In detail, the 
average cost efficiency at quantile 0.05 is always higher that average cost efficiency at 
quantile 0.25 for all clusters of DD scores. Note that in the case of conditional 
distributions for low DD scores, that range between 0 to 6, the average cost efficiency 
score derived under quantile 0.95 is higher than the average efficiency score of 
quantile 0.75. In other words, at the upper tails of the distribution and for low values 
of distance-to-default (high default risk), cost efficiency does not follow the negative 
trend observed in the case of higher DD scores and lower quantiles.  
                                               
12
 We identify the five groups of banks based on the histogram of the distance to default scores reported 
in Appendix C. The median value of the distance to default is calculated at 10.34. 
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 (Please insert Figures 2 and 3 about here) 
Nevertheless, the most striking finding derived from Figure 3 is that the 
relationship between efficiency and distance-to-default differs not only across the 
various quantiles, but also across different levels of default risk. In particular, in both 
tails of the distribution of banks’ distance-to-default (banks with the highest and the 
lowest default risk), we observe a clear positive relationship between cost efficiency 
and distance-to-default across all quantiles. That is, cost efficiency increases for 
higher scores of distance-to-default, or in other words for lower levels of risk and this 
positive relationship is particularly apparent in the case of the riskiest and the safest 
banks in our sample.  
On the other hand, the relationship between cost efficiency and distance-to-
default for banks that have DD scores that lay around the median of the distribution is 
less clear and differs across quantiles. In particular, for banks with DD scores around 
the median in our sample we observe a negative relationship between cost efficiency 
and banks’ distance-to-default for quantiles 0.05, 0.25 and 0.95. This is however less 
clear in the case of quantiles 0.50 and 0.75, as the relationship between cost efficiency 
and distance-to-default changes trend for banks with DD scores around the median.  
Overall, our results suggest that while there is some indication of a positive 
relationship between cost efficiency and the distance to default for most quantiles and 
for most classifications of DD scores, in the case of the 0.5 and 0.75 quantile 
distributions and for values of the distance to default from 8.01 to 10.34, cost 
efficiency seems to follow a different path. Thus, more analysis is warranted so as to 
draw more definite conclusions on this issue.  
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To this end, we regress banks’ distance to default on cost efficiency derived at 
different quantiles. Results are presented in Table 4.13 Despite the fact that only a 
small part of the variation in cost efficiency is explained by the distance to default, we 
can observe a clear positive relationship between the two variables that increases in 
magnitude and significance for higher quantiles, suggesting that a higher level of 
efficiency is associated with a higher distance to default and thus with lower risk. 
More specifically, whereas for low order quantiles the coefficient of DD is not 
significant, for quantiles 0.75 and 0.95 this coefficient becomes highly statistically 
significant and also increases in magnitude.  
(Please insert Table 4 about here) 
This finding suggests that an OLS analysis, which is close to the median 
quantile (0.5), would be misleading, as it would report an insignificant coefficient for 
the distance to default. On the other hand, quantile regressions by permitting the 
estimation of various quantile functions of the underlying conditional distribution 
provide us with a more complete picture of the underlying relationships. This is 
evident in the present empirical application, where the distance to default appears to 
assert a significant and higher in magnitude impact on efficiency for the 0.75 and 0.95 
quantiles. Moreover, as we have showed in the previous section, cost efficiency on 
average decreases for higher order quantiles (at 0.75 and 0.95) compared to lower 
order quantiles. Thus, the positive coefficient of the distance-to-default variable may 
suggest that risk asserts a higher impact on banks with low cost efficiency, or 
alternatively phrased, banks in quantiles 0.75 and 0.95 are more responsive to risk 
than banks placed in quantiles 0.05, 0.25 and 0.5.  
 
                                               
13
 We also include country dummies in the regressions (not shown). Results are available upon request. 
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4.3 Second-stage regressions 
As part of a sensitivity analysis we also perform second-stage regressions, where cost 
efficiency scores derived at different quantiles are regressed on a set of 
macroeconomic and bank variables. In particular, apart from bank’s distance to 
default, the following variables are included in our estimations: the capitalization ratio 
(E/A) the ratio of loan loss provisions to loans (LLP/L) to control for credit risk, the 
liquidity ratio the return on equity ratio (ROE) that captures bank profitability, the 
logarithm of total assets (TA) to control for bank size, the ratios of loan to assets 
(LO/A) and deposits to assets (DEP/A) that capture banks’ product mix, GDP per 
capita (GDPpc) and inflation (INFL) to control for the macroeconomic environment, 
the five-firm concentration ratio (CR5) that captures market structure, two measures of 
density, the deposits per square kilometre (DEPDEN) and the branches per square 
kilometre variables (BRADEN), the intermediation ratio (INTER) that measures 
financial development, the interest spread (INTSPR) that captures competition and the 
asset share of foreign owned banks (ASFOB). The second stage regressions were 
estimated using OLS estimators, where the standard errors were calculated using 
White’s (1980) correction for heteroscedasticity. Table 5 reports the results of the 
estimation.14 Overall, several of the coefficients are significant and are in line with our 
expectations. 
(Please insert table 5 about here) 
On the whole, our previous results regarding the relationship between 
efficiency and default risk are confirmed. In particular, the sign of the DD coefficient 
                                               
14
 In order to check for potential multicollinearity correlations among the independent variables, we 
calculated variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all independent variables specified. Our reported results 
are as follows: VIF: DD (=1.56); E/A (= 2.59); LLP/L (=1.94); ROE (=1.82); TA (=3.66);  LO/A 
(=1.66); DEP/A (=1.62); GDPpc (=5.49); INFL (=3.03); CR5 (=1.97); BRADEN (=2.71); DEPDEN 
(=3.58); INTER (=5.51); INTSPR (=2.66); ASFOB (=5.84); Mean VIF is calculated at 2.93 and 
indicates no multicollinearity problem. 
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is positive across all quantiles, which implies that the higher the distance to default, 
the higher the level of efficiency. Nevertheless, this relationship becomes statistically 
significant only for quantiles 0.75 and 0.95, which is consistent with the results 
presented in Table 4.  
In addition, several interesting results emerge. For instance, we observe that 
the least efficient banks, or in other words banks in quantile 0.95, have on average 
lower loan loss provisions and a lower ratio of loans to assets. Also banks in quantile 
0.95 operate in more concentrated markets and face increased interest spreads. A 
similar (though not identical) picture emerges for the 0.75 quantile. In this case, one 
can additionally mention the observed negative relationships between efficiency and 
the capitalization and liquidity ratios, as well as the deposit ratio. Cost efficiency is 
also found to be negatively related to the level of financial development (see 
Grigorian and Manole, 2002; Kasman and Yildirim, 2006) and positively related to 
the inflation rate. An interesting finding is that the negative relationship between cost 
efficiency and market concentration that is reported at 0.95 quantile is reversed at 0.75 
quantile. In particular, for banks in quantile 0.75 a higher level of bank concentration 
asserts a positive impact on cost efficiency, which indicates that competitive 
outcomes are possible even in concentrated systems (Baumol, 1982). This finding 
suggests that the relationship between concentration and efficiency is not a 
straightforward one, as already suggested by the literature (see for example Casu and 
Girardone, 2006) and also that different interactions may exist across different 
quantiles and particularly across the most and the least efficient banks in one market.   
A similarly mixed picture emerges in the case of the loan loss provisions ratio, 
which is reported to assert a positive impact on efficiency at quantiles 0.05, 0.25 and 
0.50 and a negative one in the case of quantile 0.95. This indicates that the ‘skimping’ 
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hypothesis of Berger and DeYoung (1997) could describe more accurately the 
behaviour of the worst performing banks, while on the other hand, the relationship 
between cost efficiency and the loan loss provisions ratio for banks in higher quantiles 
may be better described by the ‘bad management’ or the ‘bad luck’ hypotheses. 
According to Berger and DeYoung (1997), the ‘skimping’ hypothesis assumes that 
there is a trade-off between short-term costs and future loan performance problems, as 
banks that devote fewer resources to credit underwriting and loan monitoring may 
appear to be more cost efficient in the short-run. This hypothesis could provide some 
explanation on the positive relationship between efficiency and the loan loss 
provisions ratio. On the other hand, under the ‘bad management’ hypothesis of Berger 
and DeYoung (1997), loan quality is assumed to be endogenous in the quality of bank 
management, indicating that managers who are poor at dealing with day-to-day 
operations are also poor at managing their loan portfolio, suggesting a negative 
relationship between efficiency and the loan loss provisions ratio. This positive 
relationship could also be explained by the ‘bad luck’ hypothesis, implying that an 
exogenous increase in non-performing loans may force even the most cost efficient 
banks to purchase additional inputs necessary to administer these problematic loans 
(Berger and DeYoung, 1997). Finally, best performing banks appear to have higher 
profitability, a higher fraction of loans in their portfolio, lower branch density and 
higher deposit density. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates cost efficiency in the European banking industry over the 
period 2000-2005 using a quantile regression analysis. This type of analysis allows us 
to estimate banks’ cost function for various quantiles of the conditional distribution 
 22 
and to examine in particular the tail behaviours of that distribution. This is relevant in 
light of the documented heterogeneity in bank efficiency across European countries.  
We address several questions related to cost efficiency while we also 
incorporate risk in our analysis, in light also of the current re-appraisal of risk 
triggered by the global financial crisis. On the whole, we observe significant 
differences in the average efficiency across quantiles as well as across countries. 
Moreover, bank efficiency exhibits a steady negative trend across quantiles, 
suggesting that cost efficiency is higher for lower quantiles of the conditional 
distribution compared to higher ones. Also, our analysis suggests that the observed 
disparity of efficiency scores across conditional distributions is significant, which 
makes the quantile regression estimation a more comprehensive framework for 
assessing the performance of financial institutions compared to the classical 
estimation. 
Regarding the relationship between cost efficiency and risk, our findings 
suggest that there is a positive relationship between efficiency and risk, in particular 
for higher quantiles. In detail, our results suggest that risk asserts a higher impact on 
banks with low cost efficiency, or in other words, banks in quantiles 0.75 and 0.95 are 
more responsive to risk than banks placed in quantiles 0.05, 0.25 and 0.5. Moreover, 
in a second-stage regression framework, we investigate the relationship between 
efficiency and various macroeconomic and banking variables. Our results indicate that 
interactions between efficiency and various control variables also vary significantly 
across quantiles. Two notable examples are the relationship between cost efficiency 
and concentration and the relationship between efficiency and credit risk.   
 Overall, researchers and policy makers can draw some useful lessons from this 
study. In particular, it has been clearly highlighted that due to the high degree of 
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observed heterogeneity in the European banking industry, when examining bank 
performance it is important to supplement the estimation of conditional mean 
functions with an entire family of conditional quantile functions, so as to get a more 
comprehensive picture of efficiency scores. Otherwise, there is a danger of 
significantly overestimating banks’ efficiency scores, especially for financial 
institutions that are placed at the lower tail of the distribution. In addition, our 
findings regarding the relationships between efficiency and default risk, concentration 
and credit risk suggest that the interaction between these variables may vary 
substantially across quantiles. In other words, the attitude of banks towards risk and 
their strategic decisions regarding risk management may well depend on their location 
in the conditional distribution of cost efficiency. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Country AT BE DK FR DE GR IE IT LU NL PT ES SE UK EU 
Cost                
Cost (in % of total assets) 4.341 6.696 5.410 9.685 11.441 6.937 4.290 4.816 7.177 4.689 5.686 4.341 4.217 6.439 6.553 
 (1.175) (3.681) (1.212) (14.033) (17.683) (1.889) (1.691) (1.076) (2.509) (1.484) (0.757) (1.289) (1.133) (4.308) (8.152) 
Input prices                
Price of labour 0.913 0.768 2.002 4.594 3.883 2.098 1.007 1.473 1.417 1.059 1.176 1.061 0.787 2.067 2.206 
 (0.264) (0.370) (0.621) (10.776) (8.269) (0.440) (0.356) (0.323) (0.440) (0.248) (0.246) (0.361) (0.117) (2.617) (4.724) 
Price of deposits 4.535 8.353 2.480 3.721 8.058 3.440 3.697 3.365 6.155 3.725 4.923 3.334 4.917 6.786 4.363 
 (2.462) (5.593) (1.197) (1.761) (9.821) (1.628) (1.157) (1.357) (2.058) (1.689) (1.126) (1.148) (1.575) (15.638) (6.241) 
Outputs                
Loans (in % of total assets) 61.228 40.439 62.416 60.218 45.925 64.375 55.414 63.712 33.948 52.591 67.506 64.663 61.550 53.755 58.290 
 (8.953) (4.563) (9.902) (21.940) (28.270) (10.020) (13.882) (9.929) (26.035) (22.167) (4.841) (12.189) (8.914) (19.436) (17.780) 
Other earning assets (in % of total assets) 32.739 51.402 30.665 29.588 43.269 25.053 29.739 27.360 54.682 42.732 22.623 27.850 28.454 33.106 32.669 
 (8.474) (5.390) (9.891) (17.015) (21.695) (9.504) (8.277) (9.470) (23.998) (22.814) (5.674) (10.320) (8.639) (9.341) (14.712) 
Fixed netputs                
Equity (in % of total assets) 5.039 3.562 11.769 13.664 9.140 7.617 5.560 6.971 5.626 3.877 5.449 5.826 4.163 7.564 8.934 
 (0.934) (1.015) (3.839) (18.100) (15.325) (2.497) (1.266) (2.039) (1.110) (1.340) (0.556) (0.983) (0.554) (6.517) (8.963) 
Fixed assets  (in % of total assets) 1.633 0.614 1.729 2.650 2.781 2.840 1.050 1.872 1.863 1.106 1.492 1.347 0.389 1.752 1.884 
 (0.639) (0.345) (0.862) (5.044) (6.541) (1.554) (0.375) (1.203) (0.926) (0.320) (0.605) (0.551) (0.242) (2.266) (3.015) 
Bank-specific control variables                
Distance-to-default (DD) 16.146 8.310 12.006 10.059 8.562 6.436 8.715 9.845 9.551 8.889 10.646 9.289 8.102 8.578 10.348 
 (3.073) (2.830) (2.742) (2.908) (4.286) (1.513) (2.087) (2.430) (2.498) (2.589) (2.224) (2.762) (2.945) (2.592) (3.521) 
Loan loss provision (in % of total loans) 0.711 0.249 1.054 0.396 1.261 0.968 0.159 0.716 0.811 0.199 0.593 0.632 0.128 0.491 0.775 
 (0.199) (0.120) (0.420) (0.119) (1.751) (0.658) (0.096) (0.400) (0.108) (0.107) (0.194) (0.202) (0.014) (0.275) (0.744) 
Liquidity ratio  1.722 0.685 3.117 1.279 1.435 4.118 1.398 0.779 2.706 1.159 2.544 2.086 1.005 2.130 2.015 
 (0.865) (0.294) (2.419) (0.864) (1.343) (2.324) (0.803) (0.342) (1.025) (0.803) (0.753) (1.024) (0.200) (3.448) (2.006) 
ROE 11.266 19.962 16.709 16.770 6.629 3.968 19.870 14.160 15.540 21.409 15.171 17.482 19.858 25.475 15.620 
 (2.372) (3.180) (3.312) (7.691) (7.696) (5.066) (3.714) (7.102) (3.596) (3.019) (3.326) (4.131) (2.243) (6.943) (7.343) 
logarithm of Total assets 16.106 19.709 13.241 15.941 16.493 14.524 18.095 16.503 15.930 17.435 17.066 17.631 18.885 18.400 15.822 
 (1.438) (0.380) (1.709) (2.207) (2.878) (0.432) (0.486) (1.773) (1.793) (2.088) (0.916) (1.457) (0.411) (2.417) (2.707) 
Country-specific control variables                
CR5 44.467 81.267 66.050 47.917 20.950 66.100 43.983 27.200 29.400 83.250 62.883 43.817 55.617 31.800 48.167 
Interest spread 2.317 5.028 4.106 3.633 5.265 4.977 3.524 4.732 1.437 1.063 2.655 1.925 3.219 1.744 3.756 
Intermediation ratio 129.215 79.837 284.811 124.936 124.153 71.309 140.639 149.253 61.120 133.893 130.087 106.980 224.519 117.502 174.123 
Asset share of foreign owned banks 19.415 23.850 17.900 13.224 5.424 14.560 49.883 6.867 93.767 11.467 25.100 10.683 7.133 50.467 19.200 
Branch density 0.053 0.179 0.051 0.047 0.139 0.025 0.013 0.100 0.106 0.108 0.059 0.079 0.005 0.058 0.072 
Deposit density 2.615 11.982 2.439 2.095 6.811 1.105 2.277 2.455 83.677 13.525 1.523 1.592 0.283 7.954 5.228 
GDP per capita 22467 21261 27993 21146 21545 10631 25358 17903 44815 22429 10182 13792 26004 23444 22902 
Inflation 2.089 2.188 2.127 1.883 1.581 3.244 3.866 2.442 2.442 2.504 3.120 3.256 1.369 2.515 2.244 
Note: The table presents mean values and standard deviations in parentheses. Total cost, outputs and fixed netputs are expressed as a percentage of total assets. The price of labour is defined as personnel 
expenses to total assets (in percent); the price of deposits is defined as interest expenses to total deposits (in percent). Distance-to-default is calculated by the methodology proposed by Merton (1974). The 
liquidity ratio is defined as cash and due from banks divided by total assets (in percent). ROE is defined as profit before tax to equity (in %). CR5 is defined as the sum of the market share of the five largest 
banks in terms of total assets. Interest spread is defined as the difference between the average lending rate and the deposit rate. The intermediation ratio is defined as the ratio of total loans to total deposits. 
Branch density is defined as branches per square kilometer, while deposit density is defined as Total deposits per square kilometer. Sources: Bankscope, Datastream, Bloomberg, World Development 
Indicators, ECB reports, Central bank reports. 
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Table 2: Post estimation linear hypotheses testing 
H0: Q5= Q25 H0: Q25= Q50 H0: Q50= Q75 H0: Q75= Q95 
Test whether: 
Translog cost function 
coefficients are equal 
between quantiles Q5 and 
Q25 
 
F (19, 653) = 15.78 
Probability>F = 0.000 
Test whether: 
Translog cost function 
coefficients are equal 
between quantiles Q25 
and Q50 
 
F (19, 653) = 24.62 
Probability >F = 0.000 
Test whether: 
Translog cost function 
coefficients are equal 
between quantiles Q50 
and Q75 
 
F (19, 653) = 6.23 
Probability >F = 0.000 
Test whether: 
Translog cost function 
coefficients are equal 
between quantiles Q75 and 
Q95 
 
F (19, 653) = 13.19 
Probability >F = 0.000 
Note: The table presents F-tests for testing the hypothesis whether coefficients between different quantiles are equal. 
Quantiles have been estimated by simultaneous regression analysis. Standard errors were obtained by bootstrapping 
with 100 replications.  
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Table 3: Quantile cost efficiency scores across banks 
 EFF Q5 EFF Q25 EFF Q50 EFF Q75 EFF Q95 
ABN Amro Holding NV 0.9166 0.8514 0.7680 0.6644 0.5979 
Alliance & Leicester Plc 0.8779 0.8195 0.7530 0.6785 0.6665 
Allied Irish Banks plc 0.7779 0.7275 0.7751 0.7589 0.7029 
Amagerbanken, Aktieselskab 0.8593 0.8148 0.7355 0.6448 0.6037 
Arbuthnot Banking Group Plc 0.8204 0.8914 0.7901 0.7143 0.8464 
Aspis Bank SA 0.8537 0.7931 0.7091 0.6609 0.5974 
Baader Wertpapierhandelsbank AG 0.9728 0.9110 0.7800 0.6609 0.5974 
Banca Ifis SpA 0.9647 0.8898 0.7934 0.7254 0.6732 
Banca Lombarda e Piemontese SpA 0.9069 0.8941 0.8334 0.7313 0.6688 
Banca popolare dell'Emilia Romagna 0.9346 0.8960 0.8059 0.6982 0.6713 
Banca Popolare di Intra - Societa Cooperativa per Azioni 0.9256 0.9203 0.8426 0.7616 0.7324 
Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL 0.8599 0.8266 0.7731 0.6828 0.6979 
Banca Popolare di Sondrio Societa Cooperativa per Azioni 0.8886 0.8521 0.7651 0.6709 0.6302 
Banca Popolare di Spoleto SpA 0.8800 0.8498 0.7767 0.6882 0.7021 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 0.8280 0.8095 0.7666 0.6773 0.6244 
Banco BPI SA 0.9153 0.8651 0.8067 0.7087 0.7072 
Banco Desio - Banco di Desio e della Brianza SpA 0.8259 0.8376 0.8338 0.7491 0.7119 
Banco di Sardegna SpA 0.9248 0.8806 0.8000 0.7005 0.6939 
Banco Espirito Santo SA 0.8838 0.8387 0.7702 0.6795 0.6786 
Banco Pastor SA 0.9711 0.8991 0.8199 0.7101 0.6635 
BANIF SGPS SA 0.9058 0.8504 0.7633 0.6598 0.6232 
Bank of Attica SA 0.9638 0.8895 0.7809 0.7346 0.7043 
Bank of Ireland 0.8126 0.7471 0.8120 0.7997 0.6945 
Bankinter SA 0.8955 0.8649 0.7738 0.6805 0.6420 
Banque de Savoie 0.9717 0.9535 0.8882 0.7934 0.7326 
Banque Degroof Luxembourg SA 0.7430 0.7051 0.7406 0.6678 0.6265 
Banque Tarneaud 0.9312 0.8688 0.7747 0.6923 0.6565 
Barclays Plc 0.8591 0.8806 0.7607 0.6609 0.5974 
Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG 0.8738 0.8836 0.8013 0.7184 0.8088 
Berlin Hyp-Berlin-Hannoverschen Hypothekenbank AG 0.9208 0.8716 0.7571 0.6735 0.6297 
BKS Bank AG 0.9198 0.8659 0.7911 0.7481 0.7454 
Bonusbanken A/S 0.8852 0.8704 0.7758 0.6962 0.7344 
Commerzbank AG 0.8915 0.8811 0.7713 0.6923 0.7893 
Concord Effekten AG 0.9728 0.9110 0.7800 0.6609 0.5974 
Credit Agricole de l'Ille-et-Vilaine 0.9163 0.8856 0.7753 0.6876 0.6305 
Credit Agricole de Toulouse et du Midi Toulousain 0.9351 0.8960 0.7919 0.7106 0.6631 
Credit Agricole du Morbihan 0.8288 0.8089 0.7246 0.6565 0.6109 
Credit Agricole Loire Haute-Loire 0.8375 0.8135 0.7261 0.6599 0.6236 
Credit Industriel et Commercial - CIC 0.8808 0.8136 0.7919 0.7239 0.6667 
Credit Agricole Alpes Provence 0.9223 0.8929 0.7871 0.7074 0.6694 
Credit Agricole Sud Rhene Alpes 0.8914 0.8499 0.7550 0.6778 0.6332 
Credito Artigiano 0.8578 0.8190 0.7426 0.6538 0.6475 
Credito Emiliano SpA 0.8515 0.8023 0.7417 0.6492 0.6483 
Credito Valtellinese SCarl 0.8771 0.8453 0.7674 0.6671 0.6202 
DAB Bank AG 0.4234 0.4286 0.3837 0.3921 0.5974 
Danske Bank A/S 0.9592 1.0000 0.9450 0.8318 0.7025 
Deutsche Bank AG 0.8957 0.8444 0.7691 0.7077 0.8986 
Deutsche Hypothekenbank (Actien-Gesellschaft) 0.9728 0.9110 0.8468 0.8247 0.6780 
Dexia 0.8496 0.8015 0.7524 0.8172 0.6190 
DiBa Bank A/S 0.8800 0.8622 0.7879 0.7085 0.6950 
Djurslands Bank A/S 0.9398 0.9057 0.8208 0.7204 0.6945 
DVB Bank AG 0.8454 0.8198 0.7606 0.6949 0.7745 
Erste Bank der Oesterreichischen Sparkassen AG 0.7775 0.7266 0.6845 0.6462 0.6065 
Espirito Santo Financial Group S,A, 0.9728 0.9110 1.0000 1.0000 0.8662 
FB Bank Copenhagen A/S-Forstaedernes Bank A/S 0.8056 0.7925 0.7251 0.6462 0.6293 
Fionia Bank A/S 0.8888 0.8607 0.7693 0.6864 0.6672 
Fortis 0.6427 0.5910 0.5822 0.6792 0.6383 
General Bank of Greece SA 0.9728 0.9110 0.8082 0.7475 0.6503 
Gronlandsbanken A/S-Bank of Greenland 0.8660 0.8526 0.7685 0.6863 0.7294 
Gruppo Monte dei Paschi di Siena 0.9041 0.8692 0.8210 0.7157 0.6771 
Hadsten Bank Aktieselskab 0.8654 0.8615 0.7665 0.6738 0.6546 
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HBOS Plc 0.8606 0.8813 0.7995 0.7031 0.6460 
HSBC Holdings Plc 0.9517 0.9166 0.7996 0.7200 0.6665 
HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt AG 0.9340 0.9137 0.8153 0.7979 1.0000 
IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG 0.6534 0.6585 0.6785 0.6775 0.6648 
Irish Life & Permanent Plc 0.7966 0.7438 0.8150 0.8412 0.7816 
Jyske Bank A/S (Group) 0.9031 0.8821 0.8196 0.7224 0.6410 
Kas Bank NV 0.9498 0.8906 0.7876 0.7168 0.6241 
KBC Groupe SA 0.9728 0.9110 0.8028 0.8903 0.7870 
Kreditbanken A/S 0.9725 0.9363 0.8513 0.7741 0.7810 
LBB Holding AG-Landesbank Berlin Holding AG 0.8734 0.8500 0.7709 0.7130 0.8195 
Lloyds TSB Group Plc 0.9641 0.9137 0.8252 0.7265 0.7129 
Lokalbanken i Nordsjaelland 0.8880 0.8309 0.7508 0.6762 0.6225 
Lollands Bank 0.9143 0.8903 0.8024 0.7286 0.7017 
Man Group Plc 0.9728 0.9110 0.7812 0.7013 0.8211 
Max Bank A/S 0.7985 0.7930 0.7220 0.6616 0.6427 
Merkur-Bank KGaA 0.8492 0.8313 0.7503 0.6609 0.6473 
Millennium bcp-Banco Comercial Portugues, SA 0.9390 0.8935 0.8000 0.6756 0.6415 
Moens Bank A/S 0.9086 0.8839 0.8040 0.7196 0.7104 
Morsoe Bank 0.9128 0.8932 0.7926 0.7081 0.6881 
Natexis Banques Populaires 0.8433 0.7997 0.7581 0.6741 0.6225 
Noerresundby Bank A/S 0.9539 0.9098 0.8268 0.7441 0.7286 
Nordea Bank AB 0.9480 0.9088 0.7909 0.6969 0.6003 
Nordfyns Bank 0.7629 0.7776 0.7174 0.6310 0.6164 
Nordjyske Bank A/S 0.9565 0.8848 0.8136 0.7339 0.7101 
Northern Rock Plc 0.8483 0.7976 0.7324 0.6377 0.5974 
Oberbank AG 0.9036 0.8448 0.7704 0.7270 0.7033 
Oesterreichische Volksbanken AG 0.7235 0.6829 0.6666 0.6719 0.6120 
Oestjydsk Bank A/S 0.8454 0.8238 0.7159 0.6416 0.6321 
Oldenburgische Landesbank - OLB 0.9580 0.9285 0.8132 0.7370 0.9503 
Ringkjoebing Bank 0.9626 0.9253 0.8403 0.7551 0.7548 
Ringkjoebing Landbobank 0.9503 0.9408 0.8579 0.7644 0.7602 
Roskilde Bank 0.9088 0.8694 0.7802 0.6809 0.6361 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc (The) 0.8666 0.8302 0.7259 0.6587 0.5995 
Salling Bank A/S 0.7789 0.7859 0.7165 0.6327 0.6122 
San Paolo IMI 0.8553 0.8505 0.8003 0.6891 0.6548 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 0.9704 0.8780 0.7593 0.6617 0.6104 
Skjern Bank 0.8943 0.8726 0.7714 0.6842 0.6457 
Societe Generale 0.9508 0.8993 0.8448 0.7718 0.7015 
Spar Nord Bank 0.8670 0.8275 0.7497 0.6590 0.6210 
Sparbank Vest A/S 0.7604 0.7846 0.7749 0.6679 0.6329 
Sparekassen Faaborg A/S 0.9623 0.9671 0.9173 0.8147 0.8117 
Standard Chartered Plc 0.9215 0.8808 0.7881 0.6964 0.7113 
Swedbank AB 0.9382 0.9023 0.7937 0.6992 0.6321 
Sydbank A/S 0.8911 0.8433 0.7591 0.6657 0.6037 
Toender Bank A/S 0.8823 0.8683 0.7630 0.6842 0.6550 
Totalbanken A/S 0.8853 0.8504 0.7630 0.6837 0.6573 
UniCredito Italiano SpA 0.8541 0.8287 0.7578 0.6628 0.6003 
Union Financiere de France Banque 0.8223 0.7357 0.7351 0.6609 0.5974 
Van Lanschot NV 0.9510 0.8897 0.7983 0.6897 0.6022 
Vestjysk Bank A/S 0.8882 0.8498 0.7623 0.6678 0.6271 
Vinderup Bank A/S 0.8686 0.8435 0.7389 0.6943 0.7141 
Vorarlberger Landes-und Hypothekenbank AG 1.0000 0.9761 0.9871 0.9563 0.8400 
Vorarlberger Volksbank 0.9056 0.8610 0.7935 0.7308 0.6844 
Vordingborg Bank A/S 0.8230 0.8364 0.7730 0.6993 0.6900 
Note: The table presents bank-specific efficiency scores under different quantiles (Q5, Q25, Q50, Q75, Q95), as estimated by 
employing the DFA approach.   
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Table 4: Regression results: Cost efficiency and distance to default 
  Q5 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q95 
  
Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. 
DD 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.007** 0.003 0.011***    0.003 
constant 0.824*** 0.048 0.808*** 0.044 0.731*** 0.040 0.614*** 0.037 0.541 0.043 
R-sq 0.129 
 
0.160  0.177  0.259 
 
0.271 
 
Note: The table presents coefficient estimates when regressing efficiency scores derived under different quantiles on 
distance-to-default. Dependent variable: cost efficiency under quantiles 0.05 (Q5), 0.25 (Q25), 0.5 (Q50), 0.75 (Q75) and 0.95 
(Q95). Robust standard errors are presented in italics. Country dummies are also included (not shown) *, **, ***, indicate 
significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
 
Table 5: Second-stage regressions 
  Q5 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q95 
DD 0.0018 0.0006 0.0040 0.0075*** 0.0088*** 
  0.0032 0.0030 0.0025 0.0023 0.0029 
E/A -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0017* -0.0010 
  0.0013 0.0012 0.0010 0.0009 0.0012 
LLP/L 0.0332** 0.0275** 0.0176* 0.0066 -0.0280** 
  0.0132 0.0125 0.0104 0.0096 0.0122 
ROE 0.0027** 0.0021* 0.0023** 0.0014 0.0002 
  0.0013 0.0012 0.0010 0.0009 0.0012 
LIQR -0.0048 -0.0043 -0.0062* -0.0053* 0.0017 
  0.0040 0.0038 0.0032 0.0029 0.0037 
TA 0.0025 0.0009 0.0022 0.0008 -0.0049 
  0.0050 0.0047 0.0039 0.0036 0.0046 
LO/A 0.0009* 0.0010* 0.0008* 0.0005 -0.0011** 
  0.0006 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 
DEP/A -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0013*** -0.0016*** 0.0000 
  0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 
GDPpc -0.00000674* -0.0000076** 0.0000 0.00000624** 0.0000 
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DEPDEN 0.0034** 0.0027* 0.0032*** 0.0004 -0.0008 
  0.0015 0.0014 0.0012 0.0011 0.0014 
CR5 0.0004 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0012*** -0.0010** 
  0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 
BRADEN -0.606** -0.3673 -0.5580** -0.2213 0.3611 
  0.3020 0.2847 0.2364 0.2187 0.2789 
INTERM 0.0002 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0005*** 0.0000 
  0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
ASFOB -0.0009 0.0000 -0.0011 -0.0002 0.0016 
  0.0011 0.0010 0.0009 0.0008 0.0010 
INTSP -0.0042 -0.0070* 0.0052 0.0229*** 0.0186** 
  0.0098 0.0092 0.0077 0.0071 0.0090 
INFL -0.0320 -0.0421* 0.0207 0.0367** -0.0030 
  0.0250 0.0236 0.0196 0.0181 0.0231 
constant 1.0140*** 1.0206*** 0.6980*** 0.4422*** 0.6876*** 
  0.1794 0.1690 0.1404 0.1299 0.1656 
R2 0.2143 0.2095 0.2991 0.4191 0.2892 
F 1.67 (0.065) 1.62 (0.077) 2.61 (0.002) 4.42 (0.000) 2.49 (0.003) 
Note: The table presents coefficient estimates when regressing efficiency scores derived under different 
quantiles on various banking and macroeconomic variables. Dependent variable: cost efficiency under 
quantiles 0.05 (Q5), 0.25 (Q25), 0.5 (Q50), 0.75 (Q75) and 0.95 (Q95). Robust standard errors are presented in 
italics. *, **, ***, indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Quantile cost efficiency across countries 
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Note: The horizontal axis describes the range of different quantiles (0.05, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 0.95) and the vertical axis the 
corresponding average cost efficiency by country, as measured in a scale from 0 to 1. 
 
Figure 2: Average quantile cost efficiency and DD scores. 
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Note: The horizontal axis describes the range of the different DD scores and the vertical axis the 
corresponding total cost efficiency, as measured in a scale from 0 to 1. 
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Figure 3: Quantile cost efficiency scores across different scores of DD 
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Note: The horizontal axis presents the five categories of DD scores (defined based on the median of DD 
scores in our sample). The vertical axis presents cost efficiency scores, as measured in a scale from 0 to 1, 
derived under different quantiles (Q5, Q25, Q50, Q75, Q95). 
 
 
 
 34 
APPENDIX A 
 
Deriving distance to default 
In order to derive banks’ distance to default, we employ the optimisation model of 
Merton (1974) of credit risk. Τhe Merton model is based on the option pricing of 
Black and Scholes (1973) to estimate the market value of the bank assuming that the 
asset value follows a geometric Brownian motion with a drift. In some detail, the 
main components of the distance to default are: the market value of the bank’s assets, 
the asset risks, which measure the uncertainty or risk, and lastly the leverage, which 
provides insights over the bank’s contractual liabilities. Moreover, the market value of 
the bank’s assets follows a stochastic process that is a geometric Brownian motion 
with a drift:  
dMVB = µMVBdt+σBMVBdz                    ( A1) 
where MVB and dMVB is the bank’s asset value and change in the asset value 
respectively, µ, σB is the bank’s asset value drift and volatility, while dz is a Wiener 
process. Here, we assume that the drift, as in the Merton model, can be approximated 
by the risk free interest rate. 
The liabilities are both the bank’s debt (D) and equity (E), thus the market value of 
equity (MVE) is: 
 MVE = MVE N(d1)-De-rTN(d2)               (A2) 
, where 
T
r
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MV
d
B
BB
σ
σ )
2
()ln(
2
1
++
= , Tdd Bσ−= 12 , with r being the risk free interest 
rate. Now, it can be shown that the volatility of equity and market value of bank are 
related as follows: 
BdNE BE σσ )( 10 =            (A3) 
 35 
From the above system of equations (A2) and (A3) we can solve for MVB and σB, so 
as to derive the bank’s distance to default, the measure of our risk, as: 
T
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µ )
2
()ln(
2
−+
=                 (A4) 
The DD essentially measures the number of standard deviations that the bank is away 
from default. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Table B1: Cost function estimates under different quantiles 
 Q5 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q95 
lnC Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
ln(p1) 0.269 1.610 -0.044 -0.240 -0.133 -0.830 -0.080 -0.340 0.003 0.010 
ln(p2) 0.691 1.950 0.998 5.000 1.133 5.700 0.945 4.160 0.992 3.710 
ln(y1) 0.603 4.950 0.726 4.340 0.678 4.220 0.557 4.120 0.759 2.880 
ln(y2) 0.514 3.120 0.463 5.200 0.509 4.230 0.351 4.010 0.214 1.470 
ln(n1) 0.038 0.120 -0.093 -0.530 -0.131 -0.570 0.025 0.130 0.062 0.200 
ln(n2) -0.131 -0.620 -0.024 -0.190 0.026 0.170 0.175 0.940 0.127 0.780 
ln(p12) -0.025 -0.360 0.003 0.060 -0.017 -0.290 -0.008 -0.160 -0.044 -0.860 
ln(y12) 0.133 4.990 0.112 5.170 0.143 4.850 0.141 5.390 0.102 2.660 
ln(y22) 0.139 8.540 0.131 8.390 0.156 7.770 0.159 7.880 0.146 4.820 
ln(y1)ln(y2) -0.142 -5.980 -0.132 -6.940 -0.161 -6.570 -0.154 -6.440 -0.132 -3.790 
ln(n12) -0.063 -0.970 0.009 0.220 0.048 0.880 0.051 1.310 0.039 0.760 
ln(n22) -0.063 -1.250 0.002 0.050 0.041 1.020 0.046 1.780 0.033 0.850 
ln(n1)ln(n2) 0.068 1.290 0.002 0.060 -0.036 -0.790 -0.049 -1.570 -0.034 -0.820 
ln(y1)ln(p1) -0.070 -1.790 -0.063 -2.220 -0.060 -1.460 -0.052 -1.480 -0.054 -1.390 
ln(y2)ln(p1) -0.054 -0.960 -0.027 -1.010 0.030 1.420 0.032 1.100 0.038 0.910 
ln(n1)ln(p1) 0.085 1.180 0.006 0.130 -0.033 -0.880 -0.048 -1.030 0.011 0.160 
ln(n2)ln(p1) 0.127 3.590 0.078 2.900 0.052 2.310 0.001 0.040 0.040 1.030 
AT -0.358 -3.350 -0.081 -1.450 -0.039 -0.700 0.003 0.070 0.045 1.080 
BE -0.028 -0.490 0.001 0.020 0.033 0.280 0.068 0.490 0.215 1.700 
FR 0.001 0.020 0.099 4.640 0.096 4.290 0.094 3.780 0.155 2.660 
DE 0.013 0.390 0.075 1.630 0.079 1.160 0.077 1.370 0.326 1.550 
GR 0.038 0.790 0.073 1.540 0.123 3.070 0.151 4.650 0.200 4.750 
IE -0.548 -2.830 0.038 0.670 0.084 1.440 0.085 2.890 0.694 2.160 
IT -0.137 -2.900 -0.051 -2.020 -0.017 -0.520 0.005 0.240 0.077 1.960 
LU 0.033 0.580 0.068 1.040 0.049 0.580 0.110 0.920 0.123 0.820 
NT 0.011 0.320 0.047 1.480 0.073 1.370 0.082 2.150 0.213 2.860 
PT 0.041 0.910 0.105 2.040 0.097 2.420 0.090 2.970 0.181 4.950 
ES -0.246 -2.430 -0.010 -0.190 0.011 0.320 0.052 1.300 0.150 3.510 
SE -0.063 -1.030 -0.024 -0.250 0.056 1.320 0.042 0.940 0.105 2.520 
UK 0.054 0.740 0.133 3.970 0.148 3.550 0.186 6.020 0.358 6.830 
constant -2.918 -3.560 -3.163 -7.310 -3.144 -5.360 -2.821 -3.680 -3.235 -3.490 
R2 0.9461  0.9551  0.9573  0.9569  0.9442  
Note: Quantiles have been estimated by simultaneous regression analysis. Standard errors were obtained by 
bootstrapping with 100 replications. Standard homogeneity and symmetry restrictions are imposed, thus coefficients 
of interaction terms with lnp2 are excluded. The county dummy for Denmark is excluded so as to avoid perfect 
collinearity.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
Table C1: Histogram of the distance to default (DD) 
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Mean       10.34812
Median   10.01611
Maximum  18.48779
Minimum  3.945530
Std. Dev.   2.800987
Skewness   0.282781
Kurtosis   3.478416
Jarque-Bera  2.629384
Probability  0.268557
 
 
